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FRIEDRICH SCHELLING 
Michael Vater 
The place of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling ( 1775-1854) in the history of 
European philosophy is easily located: he was one of the major German thinkers 
who, in the wake of Kant's critical turn, elaborated the ambitious systematic phil-
osophy know as 'absolute idealism: and the first of those thinkers to repudiate the 
rampant conceptualism of the idealist approach and to stress instead the priority of 
actuality over conceptual possibility. Woven throughout the fabric of the writings 
and lectures he produced over more than half a century is an enduring preoccu-
pation with the question of God. Yet this is but one thread in Schelling's rich intel-
lectual tapestry, one always interwoven with four counterparts: nature; the being 
both displayed and concealed in human reality; freedom or the peculiar moral-
psychological status of 'personality: which only a free being (God included) can 
attain through a temporal process; and the divine actuality. These five elements -
deity or godhead, nature, humankind, freedom and the historical process towards 
actual personhood - are not easily separated in Schelling's thinking, nor are these 
easily detached from the historical paradigms that Schelling used to integrate 
them: Platonic and Christian creation theologies; the heterodox process theol-
ogies of Jacob Bohme and earlier Christian mystics; and, finally, the audacious 
anthropocentrism of Kant's critical idealism, founded on the Copernican turn 
that finds in phenomena only such meaning as human understanding and moral 
reason can impute to them. 
What makes Schelling a thinker difficult to access when one stands within 
the global culture of the twenty-first century is the one thing that he repeatedly 
stresses as he moves between such different conceptual approaches as philosophy 
of science, metaphysics, anthropology, history, and cross-cultural investigations 
into mythologies and religions: that human cognition forms a system, a single 
conceptual construct that elaborates the very architecture of being. That reality 
is in some sense one and univocal, that human concepts can figure it in a way 
that captures and mirrors exactly what it is, and that all the exploding domains 
of human endeavour and knowledge can find a ground in a single conceptual/ 
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linguistic construct is an audacious claim. Strictly speaking, it is now an unbeliev-
able claim. It was a difficult (perhaps hubristic) claim in its historical context; that 
the Kantian story of the efficacy of human reason in constructing the domains of 
scientific and moral discourse could be stretched by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel 
to include all human reality - social, psychological, cultural and historical - is 
literally 'fabulous: the stuff of fables. And the arch-fable, the proton pseudos, is 
painful even to contemplate today: the belief that there is one universal culture, 
one universal history, one religion with universal validity, one logic, one epistem-
ology, and one account of everything: modern, Archimedean and (of course!) 
European. When Schelling claims, then, at various stages of his long career, that 
nature, or the primacy of biology over physics, or history, or empirical studies of 
mythologies and religions will provide the royal road to Wissenschaft or system-
atic philosophy, he is committing himself to the old philosophical faith in univer-
sals, in univocal readings of texts, in literal meanings: to a unity believed to be 
found in the nature of things rather than in the activity of a cognitive interpreter. 
As skilled and clever a student of Kant as he was in his many detailed philosoph-
ical moves, Schelling was insufficiently sceptical or Kantian to see that any cogni-
tion or domain of human endeavour is an interpretation, that interpretations 
depend on a privileged selection of'evidence' or 'dati, and that a 'universal history' 
- of human science, social reality, cultures, and moral and religious ideas - is 
a conceptual impossibility, a social construct based on a particular social situa-
tion and a very specific historical configuration of human activities and resources. 
What makes Schelling more than an innocent victim of sociocultural limita-
tions, however, was the persistent resourcefulness he exhibited in overcoming the 
'idols of his tribe': early on, that nature is dead and mechanical, with biological 
phenomena counting as mere anomalies, not the fundamental subject of science; 
and later, that conceptual completeness is not the test of truth - as post-Kantian 
idealism had rather wildly assumed - but actual existence. However, it was in his 
'final' approach to system, in the replacement of the merely negative (concep-
tual) philosophy of earlier idealisms with the method of positive philosophy (or 
'philosophical empiricism'), that he falls into being insufficiently historical, cross-
cultural and empirical. The Philosophies of Mythology and Revelation of his later 
years, elaborated only in the lecture hall and untested by publication, unabashedly 
commit the fallacy of assuming that social empiricism or cross-cultural study will 
verify the initial assumption of one universal culture of reason or provide a point 
of Archimedean support for the hope in a philosophy of history with a single 
narrative thread. Alas, God (or the gods) does not speak so plainly as once we 
hoped. 
For the most part, I shall discuss Schelling's key contributions to philosophy 
of religion synchronically under the five headings mentioned above: nature, God, 
freedom, humankind and history or the manifestation of divine actuality. But 
first some historical scene-setting is needed: an account of his early life and writ-
ings, and of some of the friendships, loves and enmities that formed the personal 
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backdrop of his thinking. Until we broach the fifth theme, there is little to say on 
a classical topic in philosophy of religion, that is, proofs for the existence of God. 
For most of his life, Schelling argued that all of philosophy is the "ongoing proof 
of God': and that the construction of a systematic account of reality from the idea 
of an absolute being is all that is needed (see VH.424 and the extensive discussion 
in IY.364-9).1 
SEMINARY STUDIES: PLATO, SPINOZA, KANT AND FICHTE 
Schelling was born in 1775 to a clerical family in a Swabian village near Stuttgart. 
A precocious student, at the age of fifteen he found himself in the University of 
Tiibingen's Protestant Seminary in the company of Friedrich Holderlin and G. W F. 
Hegel. There he made his first acquaintance with the writings of Kant, especially 
those in moral philosophy. A letter to Hegel from that period shows the student's 
contemptuous disrespect for the easy berth that Kant was getting in establishment 
Evangelical circles, where simple and ' inevitable' belief in a moral God dislodged 
the strenuous efforts of earlier theologians to prove the divine existence. While it is 
probable that Schelling and his older peers undertook careful and extensive study 
of Kant's first and third Critiques even at the time when Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
was working out his monumental systematization of critical philosophy, Schelling 
also explored other major figures of the German Enlightenment: he delved into 
Johann Gottfried Herder's ideas on history, language and religion, and through 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's polemical Letters on Spinoza's Doctrine he encoun-
tered the model of 'dogmatic' philosophy that would serve, along with Fichtean 
'Theory of Science' ( Wissenschatslehre), as the twin foci of his early philosoph-
ical development. Just as he vacillates between Spinozistic 'realism' and Fichtean 
'transcendental philosophy' in his earliest writings, Schelling struggles in his later 
life between the concept of a deity immersed in nature and in fact identified with 
natural and psychological processes, and a God of spontaneous freedom, love and 
self-revelation. What makes the tension between the alternatives poignant is the 
more basic assumption of the age and of the German intellectual culture that there 
is but one process at work, one mode of true cognition, one system. 
Two texts from Schelling's seminary days prefigure themes of lifelong philo-
sophical interest to him. His Masters thesis, Attempt at a Critical and Philosophical 
Exegesis of Genesis lll, the Oldest Philosophical Fragment Exploring the Origin of 
Human Evil (1 792) broaches the theme of human freedom and the origin of evil 
explored profoundly in the 1809 Of Human Freedom. It is also a first attempt to 
explore the sorts of truth communicated in mythology, understood to be a narrative 
1. In-text references to Schelling's work are to his Siimmtliche Werke ( 1856-61 ), cited by 
volume and page numbers. All translations are mine. 
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fabricated within a limited historical and cultural content, and religious revelation, 
understood in the Enlightenment context as the communication of universal moral 
truths. The young theologian's attempt to deploy critique seem comically limited 
when read today - for example his insistence (1.13) that Moses learned the craft of 
indirect religious communication from the Egyptian priests and their hieroglyphs, 
and brought that to his 'authorship' of the great myths of cosmic and human origin 
in Genesis - but he makes bold assumptions: religious truth is universal and cross-
cultural, and the stories of one cultural tradition speak truly only when set in the 
context of many cultures and many mythologies. The specific images of the snake, 
the prohibition, eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and the expulsion by the 
cherubim are to be viewed against the background of the ancient presupposition of 
an earlier 'golden age' of human unity and unity with nature, and of a catastrophic 
transition to the current human condition of lack, yearning and lost wholeness 
(1.17-19). And this universal mythology - elaborated in Ovid, Plato, Hesiod and 
Virgil - speaks timelessly of the human condition: either to ambiguously dwell in 
sensible nature and be led by its impulses as is any animal, or to wrench one's life 
away from the comfort zone of mundane satisfactions and attain the precarious 
happiness and unhappiness of the self-posited spontaneity of reason (1.32-8). The 
Enlightenment sensibilities of Herder and Kant are evident in Schelling's exegesis; 
both human freedom and historical existence begin with the forbidden tree, and 
once humankind acquires the taste for its particularly 'rational' fruit, nothing 
else can satisfy. A 1795 journal article, "On the Myths, Historical Sayings and 
Philosophical Fragments of the Ancient World': clarifies the idea of a philosophy 
communicated through myth. A people warrants its beliefs, values and modes of 
conduct by tradition; the sayings of the founders are received and repeated in an atti-
tude of childlike trust. Whether what is passed down takes the shape of a historical 
narrative (myth, strictly speaking) or whether an abstract truth is embodied in such 
a narrative (mythological philosophy), the mode of communication is immediate. 
The ancient Greeks simply lived within the sensible (!.63-6). Human beings oper-
ating in the mode of sensibility express their lives, customs and ways of action in the 
image; all of nature becomes an image of human actuality. Only later, when chlldish 
dreams and pictures are put aside, does humanity seek to explain nature on its own 
terms: "Previously, humankind sought its image (Bild) in the mirror of nature, now 
it seeks the archetype ( Urbild) of nature in its understanding, which is the mirror 
of the All" (I. 73-7)]. For the young Schelling, mythology is a crude tool, hardly the 
plastic vehicle for the expression of religious truth, for example the coincidence of 
the universal and the individual, that he sees as the essence of Greek art and religion 
in the 1802 Lecture on the Philosophy of Art. Moreover, the young Schelling seems 
to hold the work of the imagination in low regard. Although he copied Hegel's ideas 
as expressed in The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism in his own hand in 
the Earliest German System-Program, he is worlds away from that author's vision of 
religion reconfiguring itself in the guise of a 'new mythology' in order to speak to 
an ethically and politically awakened world. 
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Schelling's recently published notebooks on Plato's Timaeus {1794) show 
a preoccupation with themes that dominate not only his early philosophy of 
nature, but also shape his later (and not especially biblical) theological specula-
tion on the process of creation. Plato's Demiurge shapes natural forces not only 
by efficient causality, but also by looking to the model of 'things that truly are' 
(see Vol. 1, Ch. 4); it thus teleologically shapes all the disparate elements and 
motions of pre-given natural stuff into the organic interdependence of 'the living 
animal': organic nature. That organic life, anthropomorphically interpreted as 
a nisus toward the cognitive and affective self-determination of the conscious 
individual, is the secret urge and goal of all natural order, the noumenal ground 
of its scientifically observable lawfulness, is the key insight into the philosophy 
of nature that the young philosopher adumbrated to such acclaim in the years 
1797-1804. It is Plato brought into the age when biology begins to displace 
physics as the paradigmatic science, or where young Germans, at least, ardently 
followed Goethe's anti-mechanistic ideas of colour and life rather than confining 
themselves to the cold rigours of Newton's elegant mathematics. Plato's Timaeus, 
along with Kant's Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, advances the 'likely story' 
(or 'wild' surmise) of a world organized with a view to reason and freedom, but 
one somehow consonant with the 'rule of necessity' or predictable force. How 
one makes that story plausible again in the age that sees, in England and France, 
if not in Germany, the triumph of a reductive empirical science is the narrative 
thread of Schelling's lifelong philosophical struggle. And it is the foundation of 
Schelling's ingenious solution to the problem of rational personality, whether 
divine or human: there must be a ground of necessity, namely nature,from which 
the free person departs in order to live in the ambiguous realm of choice and 
decision. 
While a student at Tiibingen, Schelling embarked on the tortuous discipleship 
or 'alliance' with Fichte that would first bring him to public prominence, and later 
(1797-1802) bring him into conflict with his mentor. The 1794 On the Possibility 
of a Form for Philosophy As Such loosely follows Fichte's methodological reflec-
tions in On the Concept of 'Theory of Science'. If there is to be philosophy as such, 
its form and content cannot be unrelated but must determine each other. The very 
idea of a foundational, self-evident and self-certifying philosophy carries with it 
the idea of three principles: one absolutely unconditional or self-realizing, one 
conditionally established in dependence on the first and one relatively uncondi-
tional, merging the first two; these are, respectively, the self-positing I, the not-I 
and the relative I of empirical consciousness, which is their synthesis (1.90-101). 
Schelling departs from Fichte in appending an anticipatory history of 'Theory of 
Science' in modern philosophy. What is most interesting in this regard is a discus-
sion of Kant's (notoriously unexplained) table of categories; when viewed through 
the lens of 'Theory of Science: there is only one fundamental category, relation, 
variously instantiated as totality (the I), limitation of reality (the not-1) and causal 
interdependence (the I in interaction with not-1) (1.104- 10). 
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When Fichte issued the first or theoretical section of the Foundations of the 
Science of Knowledge in 1794, he did not acknowledge its incompleteness or indi-
cate the dependence of the stuff of cognition (presentation) on the flow of non-
conscious activities of the I (striving and counter-striving,), which give rise to 
feeling or being-affected. Hence Schelling's 1795 On the I as Principle of Philosophy 
fails to do justice to the phenomenological psychology that grounds Fichte's view 
of freedom: that I as I experience myself as free only in a conditioned sense, as 
embedded in a world not of my making and not easily reshaped by my efforts. 
What it does is lucidly explain Fichte's use of Karl Leonhard Reinhold's method 
of arguing from an absolute or self-warranting principle: philosophy's founda-
tional truth, if it is to be unconditioned, cannot at all be conceived as a thing; it 
can be thought only as absolute I, that which can never become a thing. "I am-
because I am"; I am unthinkable except in so far as I think myself. The I is its self-
realization, or self-positing, as Fichte said (1.167-8). Note that Schelling argues 
as a metaphysician (or a Spinozist), not as a phenomenologist: the notion that 
philosophy might proceed hypothetically and aggregate conditioned or empir-
ical truths as it progresses is not even worthy of consideration. Only idealism 
permits one to adopt a ground of truth that is at the same time the ground of 
reality (1.162-3). If one supposed that Schelling was merely imitating Fichte in 
this essay, or providing the crabbed Wissenschaftslehre a much-needed popular 
exposition, one would underestimate him. Only the first third of the essay closely 
follows Fichte. Subsequent sections transpose the idealistic vocabulary of Fichte's 
I and not-I into Spinoza's language: the I must be "absolutely infinite"; it is the 
"sole substance of which all other items are merely accidents"; its domain is eter-
nity, not the time of empirical consciousness; its being is power (1.187-96). The 
final third of the essay projects Fichte's principles back onto the structure of Kant's 
Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason, finding in the modal cate-
gories (dismissed by Kant as an epiphenomenon of temporal location) the ground 
of all others. The same ontological cleavage that would put possibility and neces-
sity in opposition in fact contains the clue to solving the apparent impossibility 
of freedom and necessity coexisting. The freedom of the absolute, of the I, is self-
causation or necessity according to Spinoza; the transcendental freedom that the 
conditioned or empirical I must ascribe to itself is conditioned agency, elicited in 
the phenomenal I as a response to the object, which on its own terms can never 
be conceived as anything other than a product of natural necessity. Freedom and 
nature are of different orders: one must think that in the absolute, mechanism and 
teleology coincide, and for the empirical I, such an identity becomes a heuristic 
principle in science and the space for the projection of goals in the domain of 
action (1.226-42). 
While the essays on the I and the form of philosophy are dear-sighted Fichtean 
studies, done with the historian's eye turned back to the roots of Theory of Science 
in Kant's texts, especially the first Critique, Schelling shows some originality and 
anticipates some of the grand themes of the 'philosophy of identity' in the 1795 
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Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (hereafter Letters). The main 
argument of the Letters is a defence of the strategy of Theory of Science: to provide 
a theoretical construct for the freedom that is the core of the human, which 
construct can only be validated practically; by will and action. Fichte's position is 
inserted between the letter of Kant's text - where the weakness of cognitive reason 
is made a stepping-stone to the postulation of a moral God and, subsequently, 
a weak theory of freedom - and a daring defence of Spinoza's dogmatic objec-
tification of both the divine ground and the constrained freedom of the finite 
agent. Whereas Fichte's writings are of 'Kantian' derivation in that they take as 
the key to systematizing criticism Kant's chapter title in the second Critique, "The 
Primacy of the Practical': and argue for the superiority of criticism (now called 
Wissenschaftslehre, or 'theory of science') over dogmatism or the systematized 
realism of Spinoza, Schelling criticizes the mental and moral poverty of a 'criti-
cism' confined to the texts of Kant, where a weak cognitive reason allies itself with 
an impulsive and ill-motivated moral reason that simply postulates an 'objective 
God' that it desires but cannot know, and through which it desires, rather cravenly, 
to reassure itself about its own 'morality' (1.284-92). The message of the Critique of 
Pure Reason is not the weakness of cognitive reason, but the antinomical nature of 
reason, which gives rise simultaneously and with equal plausibility to realism (the 
necessity of nature) and idealism (the purposiveness of the free agent). Realism, 
in its perfect form as a Spinozistic axiomatized system, is unable to prove itself 
because it must leave forever obscure the link between the absolute and the rela-
tive, or the "egress of the finite from the infinite" (1.294, 313-14). Idealism, which 
is basically a seizing of the stance of freedom, a self-ascription of absolute causality 
or spontaneity in the face of the explanation of phenomena through the serial 
causality of the objective order, is equally unable to validate itself, argues Schelling. 
It can do no more than prove the impossibility of dogmatic realism (1.301-2). 
Schelling echoes Fichte's words that the choice between realism and idealism 
is made with one's feet, existentially, with one's lived commitments (1.307-8). 
But Fichte believed that only one of the paths carried the dignity of real human 
endeavour, and that a person whose life and character drew her to an unbending 
world of finished objectivity 'outside' was basically slavish and incapable of spon-
taneous activity. Schelling argues that Spinoza and Fichte face the same philo-
sophical task: to explain the existence of the world or, what is the same thing, of 
experience (1.313). Each raises himself to an act of intelligence (not understanding), 
and posits an absolute: Fichte, intellectual (or non-objective) intuition of self in the 
self; Spinoza, annihilation of the finite self in the intellectual love of God (1.319). 
In both cases, the finite or objective disappears. Schelling seems to endorse the 
equivalence of the alternatives: each of the two, realism and idealism, aims at the 
identity of the subject and the object, which would really mean loss of finite self 
and loss of world - if the project could be carried out (1.330). In the end, the 
only thing that differentiates realism and idealism is that the former leaps into 
the absolute and abolishes the self tout court, while idealism or Theory of Science 
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uses absolute identity as a postulate made for the sake of free activity, and thus 
approaches the absolute only as the goal of an endless task (1.331). 
NATURE 
After leaving the Tiibingen seminary, Schelling spent some years as a tutor and 
studied the natural sciences at Stuttgart. In Robert Brown's experiments with 
molecular movement, Schelling detected a key that seemed to link the mechanical 
activity. of inorganic nature and the self-organizing and self-maintaining activity 
of the biological order. He formulates a view of science that prizes two struc-
tural or organizing ideas: that nature is purposive or goal-oriented (the teleological 
principle), and that the lawfulness of natural phenomena derives from the repeti-
tion and clarification of but one logic, manifest in various orders as powers or 
exponents of the basic formula of identity-in-difference (the principle of potentia-
tion). That nature might be regarded as self-organizing activity or an expression 
of an underlying and pervasive telos whose nature is finally unveiled in human 
consciousness is an idea whose historical antecedents lie in Plato and Kant. That 
different levels of phenomena - physical, biological and psychological - express 
the same underlying activity and thus repeat a basic logic in a progressively more 
explicit fashion may have been suggested by Spinoza's dictum that the order and 
expression of power in nature is the same as that expressed in the order of mind 
and its sequence of ideas. These two quite abstract principles frame the project of 
Naturphilosophie, which set out to provide a conceptual framework for organizing 
all natural phenomena into one 'science': quite a different project from the meth-
odological and clarifi.catory reflections that we call 'philosophy of science: The 
framework is a priori (or, less charitably, empirically unfounded) and is imposed 
on the findings of the 'working' empirical sciences only to the degree, as both 
Plato and Kant recognized, that there is a human need to fabricate a story that 
might make nature one and comprehensible. 
What made the young philosopher's contributions to this sort of 'learning' 
interesting· at the end of the eighteenth century was his solid grasp of con tern-
porary empirical research and his skill in weaving the detailed theories of different 
domains into a unified picture. But the emphasis in Naturphilosophie is philosoph-
ical, not empirical. As Schelling expresses it in his first attempt at the subject, "It is 
true that chemistry has taught us to read the elements, physics the syllables, math-
ematics nature [as a whole], but one should not forget that it falls to philosophy 
to explain what was read" (II.6). And philosophy's mode of explanation is self-
analysis, the transcendental question of how the world of experience is possible 
for consciousness, or, in the language of earlier episodes in modern philosophy, 
how our activity organizes a mass of cognitive content (presentations) into a 
world of experience, with both its physical and sociohistorical dimensions. The 
knot of necessity and freedom in the undertaking wherein I resolve to clarify the 
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nature of my mind and action and end by constraining it in a world of matter and 
mechanical causality cannot be cut, for if my act is to perceive and my freedom the 
only explanation of that act, the necessary order of my presentation is the lawful-
ness that I come to recognize as the Idea of Nature (II.35). In the transcendental 
perspective, only mind can explain ideal factors: order, succession, lawfulness. 
Nature is a transcendental construct. 
Subsequent explorations of the philosophy of nature (from 1798 to 1801) move 
away from the Fichtean transcendental framework of analysis to the core concep-
tual perplexity: how can one conceive the overlay of organic nature on the inor-
ganic? For Schelling, the heart of the conundrum is metaphysical, not empirical: 
the conviction, inherited from Reinhold and Fichte, that since principles must be 
one or few and their outworking systematic or pervasive, there must be a common 
point of origin for mechanism (which traces the first causes of alteration in phys-
ical nature) and teleology {which reveals the final ground of activity in organic 
nature). As Schelling wrote in the Preface to The World-Soul (1798), this common 
point can at first only be postulated, and can be denominated only symbolically 
through antique terms such as the 'Idea of Nature' or 'World Soul: One can speak 
of the line of mechanical causality being "interrupted and turned back upon itself" 
in living phenomena, but there is certainly conceptual difficulty in supposing that 
one force or lawfulness will manifest itself in contradictory ways (11.347-50). This 
metaphysical perplexity drives the development of Schelling's philosophy in the 
period of his so-called 'philosophy of identity' (1801 - 4). 
That nature is the gradual unveiling of the power of consciousness and novelty 
within a structure dominated by automatic or homeostatic organization (physics) 
and mutually supporting differentiated functions (biology) is an obvious idea 
viewed in the context of Renaissance humanism, or a preposterous idea viewed 
in the context of philosophical empiricism. For us, Darwinian evolution vali-
dates the idea in a way that abolishes the difference between mechanism and 
teleology. What makes Schelling's (and later Hegel's) excursions into 'the meta-
physics of science' both fascinating and difficult for contemporary readers is that 
the glue that holds the cosmos together for him comes from ' ideas' (in the full 
Platonic and Kantian sense), not from the history of biological adaptation. At this 
stage, Schelling does not give a theistic face to this post-Kantian version of the 
Renaissance idea of the 'great chain of being: although he will speak metaphoric-
ally of a 'World Soul' or demiurgic organizing principle. If one pressed him at this 
point for a further account of just why nature pointed towards consciousness as its 
goal and expressed its activity in graduated stages, he would fall back on Spinoza's 
minimalistic metaphysics: one substance, call it God or Nature, and two equal but 
different orders of phenomena, the physical and the mental, expressing the same 
logic when viewed cognitively, and expressing the same power viewed affectively. 
In the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling still adheres to the 
genetic expository framework of Fichte's Theory of Science, but in the final three 
sections of the work (on history, teleology and philosophy of art) one can see 
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him mounting to a new overall conceptual structure or metaphysics, different 
from Fichte's 'subjective' postulation of indemonstrable principles through an act 
of freedom grounded in 'intellectual self-intuition: Schelling argues that beyond 
nature and the domain of human consciousness is an absolute domain, phenom-
enologically adumbrated in forms of higher culture - ethics, politics, history, 
science and art - but strictly beyond the reach of philosophy's methodology and 
argument. The artist becomes the surrogate of the philosopher confined in her 
subjectivity or the prophet/priest who can dream of an absolute order, but cannot 
supply objectivity or evidence to such claims. The work of art is at once a natural 
product and a work of freedom; the aesthetic 'genius' consciously undertakes its 
production, but unconsciously imbues her work with more than finite signifi-
cance. It is thus the analogue of the absolute and an incUcation of an ultimate 
harmonization of the opposed order of nature and human freedom {III.624-9). 
While Schelling worked to develop a dialectical metaphysics of identity over the 
next three or so years, he continued to privilege the domain of art, where ultimate 
reality enters the realm of appearances in a finite shape (as in the Greek gods). 
Allied briefly with Hegel as a co-worker from 1801 to 1803, Schelling worked on a 
tripartite system of philosophy that privileges aesthetics as its capstone, while the 
young Hegel worked on a similar scheme culminating in philosophy of religion . 
They named this movement 'absolute' or 'objective' idealism to differentiate it from 
the Fichtean construct of transcendental philosophy that (supposedly) never left 
the confines of 'subjective idealism' (or psychologism). 
Schelling's more technical efforts to fuse the divided realms of nature, ethics, 
and aesthetics resulted in several essays in 'identity philosophy' in the later years 
of his overall preoccupation with the Kantian domains of nature and aesthetics, 
chiefly the Presentation of My System (hereafter Presentation; 1801) and the 
dialogue Bruno (1802). Inspired by Spinoza's metaphysics of one substance mani-
fested in coordinated but opposite orders of attributes, Schelling makes the racUcal 
claim that philosophy has access to the absolute through reason or intellectual 
intuition (IV.ll?-19). He thus elevates the epistemic status of philosophy over 
that of art, reversing claims made in 1800. What can the philosopher do that the 
aesthetic genius could only blindly adumbrate? She can deploy a formal math -
ematical model, positing the absolute as an identity of (relative) identities, or an 
'identity of identity and difference: and provide a structural or quasi-mathematical 
model of nature as a realm of phenomena determined in all levels by a prepon-
derance of objectivity over subjectivity, alongside a realm of consciousness or 
ideal phenomena where subjectivity outweighs objectivity. Key to the theory is 
the stipulation that although 'absolute identity' is the only entity or activity that 
can be imagined, it can appear only as a healing-over of a rupture of difference, 
seen in the way phenomena arranged themselves in realms of opposites. There is 
only identity, but all that appears is identity-in-difference or indifference (IV.127-
9). The theory never defines what 'the subjective' and 'the objective' might be in 
themselves; its plausibility depends on a poetic approximation of subjectivity to 
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human consciousness and of objectivity to a supposedly external order of nature. 
What Spinoza treated as the distinct order of attributes is the same as Kant's 
distinct orders of phenomena. The former's imperceptible substance is regarded 
as the same as Kant's unembodied transcendental or rational unity of conscious-
ness, and, methodological niceties aside, the 'modern stance' of transcendentally 
grounded phenomenalism is assimilated to earlier forms of rational metaphysics. 
The conceptual gain for Schelling in these rather arid logical moves comes with 
the stipulation that all phenomena can be analysed as the 'quantitative difference' 
of factors that are qualitatively indifferent in th.e absolute; this allows the various 
stages or 'potencies' of phenomena to be arranged and displayed in a quasi-
mathematical way. Thus the claim can be advanced that "absolute identity is not 
the cause of the universe, but the universe itself ': the Romantics' hen kai pan (one 
and all). 
GOD 
Schelling's pursuit of a unified philosophy of nature gave way to essays and lectures 
in 1801-3 that attempted to recast the arid formalism of the 1801 Presentation 
in classical aesthetic, even Neoplatonic modes. The emergence of differentiated 
phenomena from the ground of absolute identity proved a difficult problem for 
Schelling: Spinoza had maintained that there is no explaining the egress of the 
finite from the infinite, and Kantian transcendentalism provided no model for 
going beyond phenomena to an existing ultimate ground. So Schelling reverts to 
the language of Platonism, transposing the graded identities-in-difference of the 
mathematical model of nature and consciousness into absolute ideas, of which 
their phenomenal counterparts are regarded as 'fallen' or self-separated individ-
uals. Working backwards from Kant to Spinoza to Plato, Schelling finds himself in 
the milieu of the creation stories in Christian theology, and he thus finds himself 
having to think through the themes of will, individuation, and the 'fallenness of 
nature: Operating off the capital of Greek aesthetics and Neoplatonic metaphysics, 
Schelling, a quintessentially 'modern' or contemporary thinker, hardly notices that 
he has returned to his theological starting-points until a contemporary mathe-
matician and scientist, Carl Eschenmayer, points out that with his 'absolute' thus 
platonically construed, Schelling had entered the domain of 'God talk' whose 
object is commonly thought to be accessible only to faith or religious intuition 
(VI.l8). The 1804 essay "Philosophy and Religion': written while Schelling was 
lecturing at Wiirzburg, shows Schelling's recognition of this theological turn. 
Henceforth, although never quite surrendering the philosopher's claim to 'system-
atic philosophy: the centre of Schelling's endeavour will be to philosophically 
situate the worldview of Christian theology in which divine creation, the 'fall' 
from grace or self-separation, freedom and the rupture between God and nature 
become the predominant themes. 
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The 1804 essay claims that God or the 'idea of the absolute' is grasped by the 
philosopher in intellectual intuition, but can be translated into the language of 
reflection or second-hand explanation in three ways: the categorical pronounce-
ments of negative theology, the hypothetical reasoning of Spinoza's self-identical 
substance ("If there is a subject and an object, the absolute is the identical essence 
of both orders" [VI.23]), or the disjunctive approach of Naturphilosophie, wherein 
the absolute is seen as the 'indifference' of both. Schelling confronts the difficulties 
of explaining individuation or the 'fall of the finite' from the absolute in a fairly 
oblique way: the possibility of the individual resides in the absolute only as 'idea: 
the actuality thereof lies in an inexplicable 'leap: a self-willed succession from 
the absolute (VI.38). Eschenmayer posed a more difficult problem for Schelling's 
nature- or identity-philosophy by raising the question of freedom and moral 
responsibility (VI.40ff.). Schelling grandly declares that in God, freedom and 
necessity are identical, and morality and blessedness are God's intrinsic properties; 
this makes the return to divine being the flipside of the phenomenal individual's 
succession from God, but offers little explanation of how 'willing' is possible at all 
in an absolute system that identifies (divine) being with necessity and with a time-
less mode of knowing in the philosopher. Taking the cosmic perspective where 
the question of human willing is not so much solved as dissolved, he advances an 
oracular statement that prefigures the process-theology framework of the essay on 
Human Freedom and Ages of the World: "History is an epic composed within God's 
spirit; it has two chief parts: the first depicts the departure of humanity from the 
center to the utmost distance from God, the second, its return. The first is the Iliad, 
as it were, of history, the second, its Odyssey" (VI.47). As for the supposed immor-
tality of the human soul, Schelling briefly argues that its being (but not necessarily 
its duration) is eternal, and that the separation of the soul from the sensible world 
in death is its restoration to the 'eternal present' that includes past and future, 
where its self-centred freedom is transformed into a state of guilt or one of puri-
fication from guilt (VI.61-2). The treatment of the human soul is cursory in this 
essay, and lacks both the feeling and the curiosity of the dialogue Clara (1810), 
written shortly after the death of Schelling's wife, Caroline. 
FREEDOM 
The last of his writings that Schelling was to publish during his lifetime, the 1809 
Human Freedom, returns to themes that Schelling had sketched in the 1804 essay 
on religion: the non-difference of God and nature, history as humanity's journey 
away from and back to its divine centre, and the problem of freedom - which were 
fudged in the earlier essay. Although he admits in the introduction that the pres-
entation of these ideas was flawed in the earlier essay, Schelling now serves notice 
that the questions of freedom, good and evil, and the actuality of a personal God 
are at the core of his philosophical system, and that the apparent 'pantheism' of 
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the Spinozistic 'nature-philosophy' that had previously stood as his system is to 
be replaced by a 'system of freedom' (VII.334-40). The impulse to vindicate the 
horizon of human agency is the spring or motor that drives human cognition, 
while the identity of reason imposes, as Kant had taught, the logical demand that 
all knowledge be integrated into a logical whole, a system. So neither science nor 
morality can be satisfied with a worldview that offers necessity and freedom on an 
either/or basis. There must, instead, be a system of freedom, no matter how contra-
dictory that sounds to the unphilosophical ear. 
The logical and metaphysical foundation for the earlier nature- and identity-
systems had been a symmetrical and non-dynamic notion of identity: A = A . 
Schelling had massaged the bare identity concept, now construing it as an 'identity 
of identities: or as (under the young Hegel's influence) an 'identity of opposites: 
but most often as 'indifference' or the lack of actual opposition between items 
conceptually opposed, that is, in exclusive disjunction. But as ingenious as all 
these attempts to build a dynamic or developmental feature into absolute identity 
were, Schelling's early systems never got beyond the flat contradictions that char-
acterized the system of earlier thinkers: the finite and infinite orders in Spinoza, 
the antinomy of necessity and freedom in Kant and the contraction between 
positing and counter-positing in Fichte's Theory of Science. Schelling was indeed 
able to organize levels of phenomena in inorganic and organic nature in terms of 
degrees of apparent freedom; this was the principle of the 'powers' or Potenzen. 
But, lacking either a conceptual or a biological principle of variation and growing 
complexity, the systems of nature and spirit were at best taxonomical exercises 
in description, possessing neither systematic unity nor a uniform principle of 
elaboration. We are so accustomed to explaining the relations between different 
phenomena in terms of the Darwinian mechanism of random mutation and 
inherited advantage that it is difficult to conceive the challenge that faced early-
nineteenth-century Wissenschaft: how to account for the complexity and variation 
of phenomena and yet attain the unity of principle that the ideal of systematicity 
demanded. As Heidegger remarked in his lectures on Schelling's Human Freedom, 
we have simply abandoned the ideal of systematicity; the so-called information 
age has galaxies of techniques, technologies and cognitive disciplines receding 
from each other in a logical space marked by 'red shift' or paradigm redundancy. 
We do not much care that a deep unity is not to be found, or that the lawfulness of 
phenomena seems to be established independent of the universality of logic. 
In the essay on freedom, Schelling first uses the crude objection to Spinoza's 
monism - that it is 'pantheism: meaning that either finite beings as a whole or 
each one individually are 'identical' to God - to re-tool his notion of identity. That 
the finite being is 'in God' means not logical identity, but a relationship of depend-
ence: the copula in a judgement denotes not equivalence, but a relationship of 
antecedent and consequent. The absolute identity required by the very concept 
of system thus encompasses both the flat-footed law of identity and the law of 
sufficient reason. If the 'creature: then, has the ground of its being in the divine 
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and must be conceived in and through the eternal, that does not determine the 
nature of the dependent entity, and so does not rule out its autonomy or freedom 
(VI1.340-46). 
Secondly, Schelling clarifies his long-standing criticism of Fichte's system: that 
it is 'subjective idealism'. The fault is not in its idealism, but in its narrowing the 
scope of philosophy to the perspective· of the finite I. The real-idealism of nature-
philosophy requires a wholly idealistic counterpart, a philosophy of will, not of 
being. "Will is primordial being; all predicates apply to it alone - groundlessness, 
eternity, independence from time, self-affirmation" (VI1.330). 
Even these two moves, however, will not suffice to generate a concept of human 
freedom, that is, agency coupled with cognition of possibilities and moral respon-
sibility. Idealism can provide only a formal definition of freedom; actual freedom 
implies agency with the possibility of good and evil outcomes. The question of the 
actuality of human freedom transforms into the question of theodicy; whether 
God is a co-author of evil. Schelling rejects the Augustinian notion of evil as mere 
privation, and insists instead that actual freedom must be grounded in something 
independent of God, if evil is not to be credited to the eternal's account. What is 
required for the actuality of evil or the efficacy of human freedom is a basis in God 
that is not Godself (VII.352-6). 
The intricate argument circles back to the reinterpretation of absolute identity: 
sufficient reason denotes not just a logical relationship, but an ontological one 
- ground and existence. What is required for the reality of human freedom (and 
hence the existence of evil) and for the exculpation of the divine is "an element 
in God that is not God" (VII.359), a pre-personal basis for personal existence. 
'Nature' is this ground of the divine existence and the stage for the actualization 
of the human potential for good and evil. Conceived in dynamic or volitional 
terms, it is a pre-rational orientation toward the rational, an inarticulate longing 
to give birth to God: a primal longing or imagination turning towards God, but 
not recognizing God (VII.358- 61). 
It would take us too far afield to discuss the influence of Bohme and other 
Protestan~ mystics on this notion of the divine unfolding from a pre-rational 
ground. That God's being can be mapped as a tripartite process of self-enclosure, 
decision and becoming personal (i.e. manifesting itself as spirit or love) provides 
an economic framework for interpreting the Trinity. What is philosophically most 
basic in this scheme is its dependence on anthropology: pre-rational and rational 
urges contend in the human domain, self-will stands in contrast to universal 
reason and the individual secures concrete existence only in her choice, her action, 
her decision. "The human's being is essentially his or her own deed" (VII.383). But 
it is in this dual tendency to self-enclosure and to universal community that the 
word of God is articulated and the possibility of spirit revealed (VII.363-4). 
One should not be misled by the language of orthodox theism that Schelling 
employs. The creation of the human order with its opposed capacities is morally 
necessary for divine revelation, the sine qua non for God becoming actual and 
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personal (VII.402). There is no person without an other, and no love without a 
counterpart that is both logically and ontologically independent of the lover. So 
God's becoming actual - love rather than the undifferentiated swell of forces in 
the primal godhead or Ungrund - depends on the human actuation of freedom. 
And the actuation of freedom means the whole sweep of human history, with its 
multifaceted instantiation of every possibility of good and evil. With the mono-
lithic identity of mere nature left behind, the actual God, the Word in the form of 
humanity suffers through all of human history, while the attractive ideal force, the 
personal God or Spirit, presses on (as ideal) toward some final crisis, some deci-
sion, some division of good from evil. 
A final section of the argument vindicates Schelling's claim that the philoso-
pher can have both system and a lively sense of freedom a nd personality. What 
guarantees system is the prior nature of God, the Ungrund or indifference of 
ground and existence; it is undifferentiated being, the counterpart of Spinoza's 
substance. Only when creative decision separates nature from freedom, longing 
from reason, and binds the two in an utterly fragile way in humankind, is there 
development, process, evolution and the possibility of love as the reunification 
of the broken pieces (VII.409-12). Although Schelling will explore 'personal' or 
'evolutionary theology' again in the many drafts of Ages of the World (1811- 15), 
those fragmentary attempts to depict the 'past of God' or God without humanity 
lack the sheer intellectual and emotional power of the insistently anthropocen-
tric - or incarnational - theology of the essay on Human Freedom. It is a darker 
picture of revelation than orthodox theology usually presents, and a much darker 
picture of human history than the Enlightenment usually suggests: '~11 history 
remains incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering God", one 
embedded in all the sordid adventures of humankind (VII.401). 
H UMAN NATURE 
In the wake of his wife's death in 1809, Schelling produced two works, both some-
what cryptic and incomplete, that considered God's counterpart, humanity, and 
its role in the elaboration of the divine being. The Stuttgart Private Lectures (1810) 
offer a synoptic view of Schelling's new 'system of freedom: while the dialogue Clara 
explores traditional questions on the immortality of the human soul, albeit from 
the unusual perspective of the phenomenon of hypnosis or 'animal magnetism' 
as advocated by F. A. Mesmer. Both works present a view of human rationality 
or personality as founded on the irrational, or the natural basis of human facul-
ties that, left on its own, manifests as madness (VII.469-70). The irrational in the 
human corresponds to the 'natural' element in God, or mere being (das Seyn), from 
which God distinguishes Godself as personal or actualized being (das Seyende). 
This process of divine evolution is identical with the creation of humanity, since 
God effects in it the evocation of consciousness out of the unconscious, or of spirit 
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(intelligence) out of matter (VII.435-6). Humanity pertains to non-being, to that 
which ought not be, and from which, when wrongly posited as something in itself, 
disease, madness and moral evil manifest. This same force in God, self-love or 
egoism, is that whereby God is a unique or isolated particular. It is only through 
the counterbalancing power of love that God becomes infinitely communicative 
and expansive, the being of all beings. Creation, or evocation of the ideal from the 
real, begins with God's 'moral' act: the subordination of self-will to love (VII.438-
9). The canvas of human history depicts the struggle between the forces of egoism 
and love, and the relative indecision of peoples and individuals over whether they 
wish to pertain to nature (Seyn) or to spirit (das Seyende). Schelling's theogony is 
still riveted on the spectacle of "a humanly suffering God" (VII.403; cf. IV.252). 
God is absolutely free since God possesses absolute, active being, whereas the 
human being is free in a derivative sense: free from divine determination because 
she possesses a ground independent of God (namely, nature) and, free from nature 
in having the divine fire kindled within her. The human ought to be the point 
where nature is transfigured into spirit and the continuity of all realms of being is 
established, but because the human realm has actuated the natural or egocentric 
principle, nature has instead become independent of spirit and taken on the aspect 
of temporality: the first period of life, or the antechamber to spirit (VIII.457 -9). 
The detachment of the human realm from its proper place, the middle ground 
between the non-being of nature and the absolute being of God, has distorted 
the three powers or faculties that make up human reality: affect ( Gemuth), mind 
(Geist) and soul (Seele). Each of these powers- conceived as a capacity for action, 
and not merely a state of being - has three aspects. 
The three aspects of affect are: longing (which tends to manifest as melan-
choly), desire (hunger for being) and feeling (which has a cognitive, although 
not conscious, flavour to it) (VTI.465-6). The second or mental level of powers is 
opposed to the first (affect); in general, it is the domain of consciousness. Its three 
aspects are: egocentric will, understanding and will as such (which, under the influ-
ence of disposition and egoistic will, tends to manifest as choice of evil) (VI1.467-
8). The ~d power (soul) is the principle of connection or continuity between the 
first two. Its aspects are: impersonal, unconscious and non-deliberative. Mind has 
knowledge, but the soul is said to be science itself; mind can be good, but soul is 
goodness itself. As the hidden divine spark, soul can relate itself to the emotional 
and egocentric element and express itself in art and poetry. Or it can relate itself 
to the highest element in the first two powers and express its inchoate grasp of 
reality as philosophy. Or it can relate itself to will and express itself as morality. Or 
it can act unconditionally, and then the sphere of its activity is religion (VII.471-
3). Disordered relations in all three categories result in affective disorders, cogni-
tive incapacities such as nonsense, or madness when understanding and soul 
miscommunicate. Madness is not a specific disorder, but a manifestation of the 
non-being or irrationality that lies at the basis of human reality: "In brief, it is 
precisely the irrational that constitutes the very ground of our understanding" 
76 
FRIEDR1CH SCHELLING 
(VII.470). Schelling's psychological realism is startling: human reality, which 
should be solidly in the centre of things, is precarious! 
The human being was supposed to be the creature of the centre, the point of 
continuity between nature and spirit. Instead of using her freedom to elevate 
nature into spirit, the human being instead reached back into nature, temporal-
ized her existence and thus postponed the reaHzation of spirit from the present -
life within nature- to a spiritual world after death. Schelling conceives 'nature' and 
'spirit' here as voHtional modes, self-absorbed ego or communicative outreach, 
so that death is not so much the separation of mind and body as the separation 
of good and evil (VII.474- 6; see also IX.32- 3). Delivered to her own ideal world, 
but not necessarily God's, the whole person continues to exist, but conscious-
ness functions irnmeiliately in the presence of its objects, and not as mediated 
through the senses. Post-death experience is akin to clairvoyance or a 'wakeful 
sleep' in which the good remember only the good and the evil only evil (VII.477-
8: see also IX.65- 6). In Clara he argues in detail that in the spiritual order God is 
directly the cause of the person's perceptions, the way the hypnotizer is the cause 
of the perceptions- deemed unusual by us- in the one hypnotized (IX.72). That 
God can in this way be the one mind of the spirit world comes from the existen-
tial disparity between God and the human creature; the former is active existence 
or agency (das Seyende), the latter mere being (Seyn). The objects to be encoun-
tered in the spirit world are much the same as those in the natural world, but intu-
itable only in a mental manner: "The world of spirit is God's poetry, while nature 
is God's sculpture" (VII.480). The more one has re-enacted the primordial moral 
act of freedom and subjected one's particular will to love, the more one is likely to 
be absorbed into the divine being in the spirit world; conversely, the more one has 
persisted in self-centred will, the more one will be separate. All of these natural-
istic features that Schelling ascribes to post-mortem existence follow from "heav-
en's perfect worldliness" (IX.99). 
THE DIVINE ACTUALITY 
In 1815, Schelling delivered an address called The Deities of Samothrace to the 
Bavarian Academy of Sciences, with the aim of empirically reinforcing the highly 
speculative vision that Ages of the World advanced of there being an 'eternal past' 
preserved in God. In the address Schelling contends that there is a primal human 
wisdom that maintains, in some faulty way, memory of both human and divine 
origins, and which is passed down in ancient mythologies. Returning to the view 
of his early seminary essays on mythology, he contends that the succession of 
deities pictured in Greek, Phoenician and Egyptian mythologies points espe-
cially to a natural basis of longing that is the beginning of the birth of rational 
personality in God - and, of course, to the transition from figurative polytheism 
to monotheistic reHgion (VIII.350). Thus begins Schelling's journey towards 
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'positive philosophY, expow1ded in the lecture halls of Munich and Berlin, heard 
by students as different as Kierkegaard and Lenin, but never committed to print. 
In Lectures on History of Modern Philosophy given in Munich after Hegel's 
death (the manuscript dates from 1833-4), Schelling repudiates the whole 
of his early philosophy - 'identity philosophy' being subsumed under the title 
Naturphilosophie - and the whole of Hegel's system as well as mere 'negative' or 
'conceptual philosophy: His early philosophy, admits Schelling, bore no relation 
to existence or to anything real, and hence when it treated the idea of God or the 
highest actuality it was merely playing with relationships that that idea takes on in 
human thought. We might say it was only conceptual analysis and totally vacant 
of significance since the question of God's reality was never posed. The construc-
tions of idealistic philosophy are a grand sham, not an ontological proof writ 
large (X.l25). This 'negative philosophy' was faulty not only in its use of a priori 
reasoning or 'construction: but also in importing a false developmental perspec-
tive into its idea of God. The point is not simply that the idea of deity undergoes 
development in its philosophical presentation, but that God is presented as the 
product of an objective process of development, as an evolution from natural force 
to rational love; God is thus present only in the end, as a result, and the so-called 
divine history (portrayed in works such as Human Freedom and Ages of the World) 
is everywhere confounded with human history and the path of thought pursued 
by the philosopher. Rightly understood, there is no becoming in God, and if one 
wants to picture this as God coming to grasp God self, either the process is eternal 
and hence not a process, or the movement of becoming is personal and communi-
cative, and the force oflove in history was nothing but the movement of thought, 
an event in the philosopher's subjectivity (X.l24-5). If these remarks repudiate 
the finite, developmental approach in conceptualizing the divine reality found in 
Schelling's philosophies of nature and freedom, they cut more radically against the 
dialectical style of Hegel's version of 'objective idealism: which plainly makes the 
divine reality a result dependent on a logical process and which moves from mere 
thought to reality only by a dialectic sleight of hand (X.126-8). 
If Schelling in the end rejects the development or process view of deity implicit 
in the philosophy of nature and explicitly adopted in Human Freedom, how is the 
divine reality to be conceived? In a segment of an 1836 Munich lecture course that 
served as an introduction to philosophy, and which his editor-son issued under 
the title Exposition of Philosophical Empiricism, Schelling reverted to classical 
modes of thought to undercut the dualism inherent in modern philosophy whkh, 
focusing as it does on presentation or perception, can never get beyond the subject-
object opposition. He uses the Pythagorean principles of apeiron and peras, and 
Plato's monad and dyad, to ascend to the idea of a 'highest cause: at once cause and 
substance (or self-caused), which brings together the relative pairs and overcomes 
the sheer relativity of the material or indefinite principle through the limitation 
imposed by the ideal, defining element (X.245-55). Only this independent and 
fully actual being (das Seyende) is capable of establishing the potentiality for being 
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in the two relative or quasi-actual principles (das Seynkonnende), and only with 
all three principles together - that which ought not be, that which should be and 
the ultimate cause - do we philosophically come to something that corresponds to 
the biblical description of God as 'Lord of Being' (X.264-5). "The highest concept 
of God, hence the highest concept in general, is that which defines God as abso-
lute independence, as fully real in itself and completely internally elaborated"; 
substance trumps causality when it comes to the divine reality (X.279). 
That Schelling reverts to classical modes of thought in his final writings on 
philosophy of religion and turns away from the 'process' or 'historical' theology of 
his middle years is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, the ontological difference 
between actuality, agency and freedom (denoted by das Seyende) and potentiality, 
passivity, and other-determination (denoted by Seyn), first introduced in Human 
Freedom, continues to play an important role in Schelling's thought, providing 
him with a philosophical means to re-establish the sense of divine transcendence 
that the negative philosophy compromised. The difference between freedom and 
being, or the superiority of agency over mere existence, is the enduring idealistic 
element in Schelling's philosophy of religion. 
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